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SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENTS IN ALASKA
AFTER HIKITA V NICHIRO GYOGYO
KAISHA, LTD. *
I. INTRODUCTION
The Alaska Business Corporation Act,1 which has remained rela-
tively unaltered since it was enacted in 1957,2 is based, in the main, on
the original American Bar Foundation Model Business Corporation
Act.3 Both suffer from the same major deficiency: they attempt to
create a single statutory framework for the organization of all corpora-
tions, but their provisions are designed to meet the problems of large
public-issue corporations, virtually ignoring the special needs of
closely held corporations. In the thirty years since the enactment of
the Alaska Business Corporation Act, many states have recognized the
problems with this unitary approach and have adopted legislation
which makes the corporate form more flexible.4 These modem corpo-
ration codes typically contain a special chapter that allows the partici-
pants in a closely held corporation to depart from the traditional
Copyright © 1987 by Alaska Law Review
* Thanks to Maureen O'Mara and the coordinators of the summer program at
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1. ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.05.003-.828 (1985).
2. 1957 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 126, at 164 (although the Alaska Business Corpo-
ration Act was extensively revised with 1980 Alaska Session Laws ch. 123 (un-
paginated), the basic format of the code was not altered).
3. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (1960) (amended 1969, 1984).
4. See ALA. CODE §§ 10-2A-300 to -313 (1980); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-
201 to -218 (1977 & Supp. 1986); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 158, 204, 300 (West Supp.
1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 341-356 (1983 & Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. § 607.107
(1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-120 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 416.75 (1985); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 32, paras. 1201-1216 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17-7201 to -7216 (1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 102(5) (1981); MD.
CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 4-101 to -603 (1985 & Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 450.1463 (West Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302.A.01 1(6a)
(West 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-515 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-21
(West Supp. 1987); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 620 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55-73 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-01(6) (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.591 (Anderson Supp. 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1371-1386 (Purdon
Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-51 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-11-220 (Law.
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pattern of corporate management by adopting measures such as high
vote requirements and stock transfer restrictions upon compliance
with certain formalities.5 Section 354 of the Delaware General Corpo-
ration Law captures the spirit of this modern approach to the close
corporation when it states that no shareholders' agreement or corpo-
rate bylaw of a close corporation "shall be [deemed] invalid on the
ground that it is an attempt.., to treat the corporation as if it were a
partnership .... "6
The enactment of separate provisions for close corporations has
encouraged courts to depart from the strict construction of corpora-
tion statutes that dominated corporate jurisprudence at the beginning
of this century. 7 This more liberal approach is typified by the New
York Court of Appeals' decision in Zion v. Kurtz 8 This case deter-
mined the validity of a Delaware corporation's shareholders' agree-
ment which proscribed any corporate action without the consent of
the minority shareholder. The agreement fell within the scope of the
traditional rule that agreements which impinge upon the authority of
the board of directors are void as against public policy. 9 The corpora-
tion had not been formally incorporated as a close corporation in com-
pliance with section 343 of the Delaware General Corporation Law10
and, thus, the agreement fell outside the safe harbor of section 350.11
The New York Court of Appeals held that this failure of technical
compliance should be ignored in view of the absence of harm to a third
party and "the liberal legislative purpose demonstrated by the Dela-
ware [close corporation] statutes .... ,,12
The need for specific provisions for close corporations to be added
to the Alaska Business Corporation Act13 has already been pointed
out in an earlier edition of this journal. 14 In the absence of a close
corporation statute in Alaska, shareholders' agreements play a pivotal
Co-op. 1977); TEx. Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 12.01-.54 (Vernon Supp. 1987); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-655 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.995 (West Supp. 1986).
5. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (1983).
6. Id. § 354.
7. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 75 A. 568 (1910); Manson v.
Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918).
8. 50 N.Y.2d 92, 405 N.E.2d 681, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1980).
9. See, e.g., Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y.
174, 77 N.E.2d 633 (1948).
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 343 (1983) (for a corporation to qualify as a close
corporation under Delaware law, the certificate of incorporation must state that the
corporation is a close corporation, state that the number of shareholders is limited to
30, and include a restriction on the transferability of shares).
11. Id. § 350 (agreements which restrict the power of directors are valid).
12. Zion, 50 N.Y.2d at 102 n.3, 405 N.E.2d at 685 n.3, 428 N.Y.S. 2d at 204 n.3.
13. ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.05.003-.828 (1985).
14. Note, Close Corporations in Alaska, 17 U.C.L.A-ALASKA L. REV. 123, 167
(1977).
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function, since they allow investors in a close corporation to inject
some flexibility into the existing statutory scheme. Through a share-
holders' agreement participants in a closely held corporation typically
attempt to allocate control, employment, participation or policy.
These agreements, however, are only useful to the extent that courts
will enforce them. Otherwise, they represent little more than a wish
list that can be ignored by the majority whenever there is a disagree-
ment. Until recently, the absence in Alaska of any case law on share-
holders' agreements left their validity open to speculation. 15
Litigation surrounding the demise of Adak Aleutian Processors, Inc.
("AAP")16 has now resolved some of these uncertainties. Unfortu-
nately, in the two AAP cases, the Alaska Supreme Court took a capri-
cious attitude to the related issue of whether a shareholder has
standing to sue for breach of an agreement. In the first AAP case,
Norman v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 17 the court decided that the
AAP shareholders' agreement could only be enforced by the corpora-
tion or through a shareholders' derivative action. In the second AAP
case, Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.,18 the court reversed its
earlier decision and held that the breach of the AAP agreement gave
rise to a direct cause of action as well as a corporate cause of action.
This note first analyzes the AAP litigation's determination of the
validity of particular provisions of the shareholders' agreement. Sec-
ond, the note reviews the Alaska Supreme Court's analysis of the
standing issue. The final section points out the problems with this ap-
proach and presents an alternative approach to this issue.
II. VALIDITY OF SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENTS IN ALASKA
Adak Aleutian Processors, Inc., was formed in November 1972
by Isaac C. Norman. Its major asset was a five year lease from the
United States Navy of certain land and buildings on Finger Bay, Adak
Island.' 9 The declared purpose of the corporation was to establish a
land-based fish processing facility on this property.20 In order to
achieve this objective, Norman needed to attract other investors with
sufficient funds and expertise in the fishing industry.21 In June of
1973, Norman sold thirty percent of the AAP stock to Alaska Foods,
a Washington corporation, thirty percent to Nippon Gyogyo Kaisha,
Ltd. ("NGK"), a Japanese corporation, and ten percent to Market
15. See id.
16. See infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
17. 645 P.2d 191 (Alaska 1982).
18. 713 P.2d 1197 (Alaska 1986).
19. Id. at 1198.
20. See Articles of Incorporation of Adak Aleutian Processors, art. 3(a), reprinted
in Brief for Appellant exhibit 1 at 9, Hikita, 713 P.2d 1197 (No. S-0494).
21. Norman, 645 P.2d at 192.
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Place, a Hawaiian corporation. All of these companies were already
involved in the fishing industry. Alaska Foods was wholly owned by
Alaska Shokai, a Japanese corporation. Alaska Shokai was controlled
by Takehiro Hikita, who with his family owned ninety percent of its
stock.22 Norman retained twenty percent of the AAP stock, the re-
maining ten percent having been transferred to the son of Akira Otani,
the vice-president, treasurer, and manager of Market Place, as a
finder's fee to Akira for introducing Norman to the other investors.23
Norman, Alaska Foods, NGK, and Market Place entered into a com-
plicated purchase agreement under which the stock was to be paid for
in installments. Until it was fully paid, the stock was to be held in an
escrow account, but the purchasers were to receive the voting rights
immediately.24
All of the AAP shareholders entered into a separate shareholders'
agreement,25 which became the basis of the subsequent litigation in
Norman v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. 26 and Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo
Kaisha, Ltd..27 The agreement required all shareholders to exert their
best efforts to achieve the corporate and business purposes of AAP.28
It also contained a voting agreement 29 and stock transfer restric-
tions, 30 and it enumerated the distribution rights to the corporation's
product,31 as well as the specific obligations owed by NGK, Alaska
Foods, and Market Place to AAP "in furtherance of [AAP's] corpo-
rate and business purposes."' 32 Specifically, NGK agreed to furnish
funds for the construction of the Finger Bay facilities, to provide AAP
with working capital, and to furnish technical assistance to AAP for
the Adak operations.33 Alaska Foods also agreed to furnish funds for
the construction of the Finger Bay facilities and, in addition, to pro-
vide the personnel to run AAP's general business affairs. 34 Market
Place agreed to coordinate relations between AAP and NOK and
22. Hikita, 713 P.2d at 1198.
23. See Purchasers' Agreement § 6(b), reprinted in Brief for Appellant exhibit I at
33, Hikita, 713 P.2d 1197 (No. S-0494); see also Hikita, 713 P.2d 1197, 1198 n.3
[hereinafter Purchasers' Agreement].
24. Purchasers' Agreement, supra note 23, §§ 4, 6(a).
25. Shareholders' Agreement, reprinted in Brief for Appellant exhibit 1 at 1-7,
Hikita, 713 P.2d 1197 (No. S-0494) [hereinafter Shareholders' Agreement].
26. 645 P.2d 191 (Alaska 1982).
27. 713 P.2d 1197 (Alaska 1986).
28. Shareholders' Agreement, supra note 25, § 1.
29. Id. §2.
30. Id. § 3.
31. Id. § 4.
32. Id. § 6.
33. Id. § 6(a).
34. Id. § 6(b).
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Alaska Foods, and to serve as liaison between AAP and the federal
and state governments. 35
The processing plant was completed under NGK's direction in
1973, but its total cost came to $3.2 million, compared to an original
estimate of $700,000. The first fishing season was unprofitable because
construction delays resulted in a late start, and NGK completely
abandoned the AAP venture in January 1975, a few days into the next
season.36 A flurry of suits followed.
In April 1975, Norman sued NGK for the balance of the funds
owed to him under the stock purchase agreement.37 In June 1975,
Nichiro Pacific, Ltd. ("NPL"), a wholly owned subsidiary of NGK
incorporated in Washington,38 brought an action against AAP for re-
payment of working capital loans. AAP counterclaimed, alleging mis-
management and abandonment. 39 Also, in June 1975, AAP filed suit
in Alaska Federal District Court against NGK and NPL for misman-
agement and abandonment. 40 In August 1975, the Bank of California,
which had foreclosed against Alaska Foods and acquired notes exe-
cuted by AAP as security for loans from Alaska Foods, brought suit
against AAP and NPL. AAP cross-claimed against NPL, asserting
mismanagement and abandonment, and NPL cross-claimed against
AAP to foreclose its working capital loans.41 In August 1977, Nor-
man sought to amend his complaint, adding NPL as a defendant and
asserting additional claims for breach of the shareholders' agreement
and tortious interference by NGK and NPL with Norman's employ-
ment contract with AAP.42 Finally, in October 1977, Takehiro Hikita
and Alaska Foods fied suit against NGK and NPL for breach of the
shareholders' agreement and a series of tort claims.43
35. Id. § 6(c).
36. See Brief for Appellee at 7, Norman v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 645
P.2d 191 (Alaska 1982) (No. 5254).
37. Norman, 645 P.2d at 193.
38. Brief for Appellee at 3, Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 713 P.2d 1197
(Alaska 1986) (No. S-0494).
39. Nichiro Pacific, Ltd. v. Adak Aleutian Processors, Civ. No. 75-4074[G], slip
op. (Alaska Super. Ct. July 13, 1976) (Nichiro Pacific, Ltd. awarded summary judg-
ment against Adak Aleutian Processors on a claim of failure to repay loans).
40. Adak Aleutian Processors v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., No. A-75-153
Civ., slip op. (D. Alaska May 3, 1976) (dismissed by stipulation without findings of
fact).
41. Bank of California v. Adak Aleutian Processors, No. A-75-182 Civ., slip op.
(D. Alaska Aug. 15, 1975) (decree of foreclosure granted to Bank of California and
Nichiro Pacific, Ltd. against Adak Aleutian Processors; Adak Aleutian Processors'
cross-claim against Nichiro Pacific, Ltd. dismissed with prejudice for failure to com-
ply with discovery).
42. Norman v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 645 P.2d 191, 193 (Alaska 1982).
43. Brief for Appellee at 12, Norman, 645 P.2d 191 (No. 5254).
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No party in any of these suits questioned the validity of the share-
holders' agreement; they raised, instead, the narrower issue of who
was the proper party to enforce it.44 The validity of such an agree-
ment, however, had been open to question in Alaska before the AAP
litigation.45 In particular, the designation of the corporate officers in
section 2 of the agreement and of the distribution and marketing rights
in section 4 of the agreement conflicted with the statutory norms set
out in the Alaska Business Corporation Act. The Act specifically re-
quires that the officers of a corporation be elected by the board of di-
rectors46 and that the board manage the business and affairs of a
corporation.4 7 The Alaska Supreme Court's adjudication in Norman
and Hikita of the issue of who was the proper party to sue for a breach
of the shareholders' agreement required implicit acceptance of the
agreement's validity and the adoption of a flexible attitude to the legis-
lative norms. The extent of this acceptance is emphasized by the
court's language and analysis in the opinions. 48
In Norman, the court relied extensively on E.K Buck Retail
Stores v. Harkert49 in which the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld a
shareholders' agreement in which the majority shareholders agreed
that each would nominate two of a corporation's four directors.50 The
Alaska Supreme Court cited with approval the Nebraska court's anal-
ysis that "the only reason the agreement was valid was that it was for
the benefit of the corporation and all shareholders alike."'s The
Alaska court then proceeded to apply the same analysis to the AAP
agreement. It stated that "a reading of the shareholders' agreement in
the instant case shows that it, like the agreement in E.K Buck, was
intended to benefit the corporation and all shareholders alike."'5 2
Although Hikita overruled portions of the Norman opinion,5 3 it also
44. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 12-13, Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.,
713 P.2d 1197 (Alaska 1986) (No. S-0494).
45. See Note, supra note 14, at 167.
46. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.228 (1985).
47. Id. § 10.05.174.
48. The court did not suggest in either opinion that the agreement itself was inva-
lid. In fact, the court quoted the agreement extensively in Norman, 645 P.2d at 196,
and held that Alaska Foods could recover damages for a breach of the agreement in
Hikita, 713 P.2d at 1201.
49. 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954).
50. Id. at 871, 62 N.W.2d at 293.
51. Norman, 645 P.2d at 196 (citing E.K. Buck, 157 Neb. at 899, 62 N.W.2d at
307). The Alaska court chose to completely ignore the E.K. Buck court's suggestion
that agreements which created "dummy" boards of directors or impinged upon the
board of directors' powers were void as being against public policy. See 157 Neb. at
890, 62 N.W.2d at 303.
52. Norman, 645 P.2d at 196.
53. Hikita, 713 P.2d at 1200-01.
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accepted this "benefit to the corporation" test of the validity of share-
holder's agreements and stated that "[a] shareholders agreement for
the benefit of a corporation does create a duty running to both the
corporation and the promisee. ' '54
The position adopted by the court in the NGK litigation allows
one to draw certain conclusions about shareholders' agreements in
Alaska. First, the strongest evidence that an agreement is for the ben-
efit of the corporation and all shareholders alike is that all of the share-
holders have signed it. In the absence of any intent to defraud
creditors or the public, an agreement made by all the shareholders of
an Alaska corporation should be presumed valid.5 5 The agreement in
E.K Buck, however, shows that, under this "benefit to all the share-
holders" test, even agreements made by a mere majority of the share-
holders may be considered valid if they can be shown to benefit all
shareholders equally.56 A showing of a direct benefit to the company
would be strong evidence of this type of agreement.57 A prudent at-
torney, however, would be well advised to beware of suggesting that
clients enter into such agreements, the validity of which would be a
question of legal fact and dependent upon the interpretation of the
courts. A court could easily conclude that an agreement among less
than a majority of the shareholders benefits only the signers. The
agreement would then fail this test for validity even though it did not
harm the non-signers.5 8
A second conclusion which follows from the NGK litigation is
that the Alaska Supreme Court appears to have endorsed the use of
shareholders' agreements to depart from statutory norms. How far
this departure can go is a matter of speculation. For example,
although the agreement among the AAP shareholders infringed on the
54. Id. at 1200.
55. Although there is no Alaska case on this point, this conclusion is the one
reached by the majority of states. See F.H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S
CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 5.25 (3d ed. 1987).
56. The agreement in E.K. Buck was signed by less than a majority of the share-
holders. 157 Neb. at 872, 62 N.W.2d at 294.
57. The control agreement in E.K Buck was part of an effort to obtain financing.
One of the company's creditors cancelled the debt owed him by the company and
invested an additional $50,000 in exchange for 40% of the company's stock and the
control agreement, which gave him veto power over company policy through his elec-
tion of two of the four directors. Id. at 881, 62 N.W.2d at 298.
58. The type of situation in which this doctrine can create problems is illustrated
by Odman v. Oleson, 319 Mass. 24, 64 N.E.2d 439 (1946). One shareholder was not a
party to an agreement entered into by all the other shareholders, but he sold his shares
to one of the signing shareholders shortly after the agreement was executed. There
was no evidence of harm to the noncontracting shareholder. Nevertheless, in a suit
between parties to the agreement seeking to have it enforced, the court held that it was
invalid as against public policy since a contract signed by less than all the shareholders
created a possibility of harm to the minority. Id. at 25, 64 N.E.2d at 440.
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powers of the directors by designating the distribution and marketing
rights, it survived the Alaska Supreme Court's scrutiny. Would a
clause which sought to prevent the company from entering any new
business or transaction without a minority shareholder's consent also
be upheld? There is precedent from other states for accepting such
agreements, 59 and an agreement could be drafted to include such an
explicit clause, along with other clauses 60 designed to allow a client to
achieve the same objective if the validity of the explicit clause was ever
cast into doubt.
Unfortunately, the Alaska Supreme Court's decisions in Nor-
man 61 and Hikita, 62 while they endorsed the validity of shareholders'
agreements, created problems of enforceability. This issue will be dis-
cussed in the next section.
III. THE ALASKA SUPREME COURT'S ANALYSIS OF A
SHAREHOLDER'S STANDING TO SUE ON A
SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENT
The most important issue before the Alaska Supreme Court in
Norman v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. 63 was whether a shareholders'
agreement could be enforced directly by a shareholder who had signed
the agreement, or whether the action had to be brought through a
derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. 64 It has long been ac-
cepted that an individual shareholder cannot bring a direct action for a
wrong to the corporation, but must bring an action derivatively on the
corporation's behalf.65 To do this, the shareholder must first attempt
to obtain a remedy through the corporation's internal procedures. 66
59. See, e.g., Zion v. Kurtz, 50 N.Y.2d 92, 405 N.E.2d 681, 428 N.Y.S.2d 199
(1980). See also supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
60. For example, the drafters could include a veto position on the board by creat-
ing separate classes of stock, each able to vote for a limited number of directors. This
designation is valid under Alaska law. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.060 (1985). Alterna-
tively, they could require a supermajority vote for board meetings. Id. § 10.05.192.
However, problems arise if a director dies or resigns. See id. § 10.05.189 (vacancies on
the board of directors must be filled by a vote of the remaining directors); id.
§ 10.05.135 (bylaws must be determined by the board of directors unless this power
has been reserved to the shareholders).
61. 645 P.2d 191 (Alaska 1982).
62. 713 P.2d 1197 (Alaska 1986).
63. 645 P.2d 191.
64. See 12B W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS § 5911 (rev. perm. ed. 1984); 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANN.
§ 7.40 annot. (3d ed. 1984).
65. See W. FLETCHER, supra note 64, § 5911.
66. This rule has its origins in the English case of Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461,
67 Eng. Rep. 189 (1843); see also Wedderburn, Shareholders'Rights and the Rule in
Foss v. Harbottle, 1957 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 194. This case still states the law in Eng-
land. See 2 F. GORE-BROWNE, GORE-BROWNE ON COMPANIES § 28.20 (A. Boyle &
[Vol. 4:311
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This requirement has been incorporated into both the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 67 and the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure.6 s Under
the business judgment rule, the refusal of the board of directors to sue
will be respected by a court and a derivative suit will be dismissed
unless either the directors improperly refused to act,69 or resort to the
corporation's internal procedures had been excused. 70 Even then, a
shareholder bringing a derivative action on behalf of the corporation
must show he is a fair and adequate representative of similarly situated
shareholders.71 There are several policies behind the requirement that
corporate injuries must be redressed through a derivative action. Any
other result would ignore the corporation as a legal entity,72 and
R. Sykes 44th ed. 1986). For a discussion of the history of the derivative suit in
America, see J. MooRE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRATICE § 23.1.15 (2d
ed. 1987). In Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 461 (1881), the Supreme Court first
required that the complaint in a derivative suit brought in a federal court must allege
with particularity the efforts made to seek relief from the directors (and, if time per-
mitted, from the shareholders if the directors refused) or else show why it could not be
done, or it was not reasonable to require it to be done.
67. The holding of Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881), was incorporated into
Federal Rule of Equity 94, 104 U.S. IX (1882), which was slightly modified by subse-
quent Federal Rule of Equity 27, 226 U.S. Appendix (1912). This was incorporated
into the old Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b), 28 U.S.C. app. (1964), which the
modem Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 substantially restates. See J. MOORE &
J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §§ 23.1.01, 23.1.15 (2d ed. 1987).
68. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 23.1. The language of this rule almost exactly parallels
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1.
69. "In a demand required case ... courts will defer to the director's business
judgment to forego litigation, absent some challenge to their investigative procedures
or independence and good faith." Woodward & Lothrop, Inc. v. Schnabel, 593 F.
Supp. 1385, 1399 (D.D.C. 1984).
70. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1071 (Del. Ch.),
aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985): "[Tio excuse demand ... the complaint must allege
specific facts which demonstrate that the primary purpose of management was to re-
tain control.... [T]he plaintiffs' complaint ... sufficiently pleads a primary purpose
to retain control, and thus casts a reasonable doubt as to the disinterestedness and
independence of the board of this stage of the proceedings." Id. For collected cases,
see Annotation, Negligence, Nonfeasance, or Ratification of Wrongdoing as Excusing
Demand on Directors as Prerequisites to Bringing of Stockholders' Derivative Suit on
Behalf of the Corporation, 99 A.L.R. 3D 1034 (1980); Annotation, Circumstances Ex-
cusing Demand Upon Other Shareholders as a Prerequisite to Bringing of Stockholder's
Derivative Suit on Behalf of Corporation, 48 A.L.R. 3D 595 (1973).
71. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 23.1. See Davis v. Coined, 619 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1980)
(lists six factors to be considered in determining whether a shareholder meets the fair
representative requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1); see also Anno-
tation, Requirement of Rule 23.1 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that Plaintiff in
Shareholder Derivative Action "Fairly and Adequately Represent" Shareholder's Inter-
est in Enforcing Corporation's Right, 15 A.L.R. FED. 954 (1973).
72. "In law the corporation and the aggregate members of the corporation are not
the same thing .... ." Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 490, 67 Eng. Rep. 189, 202
(1843).
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would result in a multiplicity of suits. 73 Furthermore, to allow a
shareholder to recover damages directly could injure the creditors of
the corporation or the taxing authorities, 74 and would interfere with
the directors' prerogative to decide how the corporate funds that had
been recovered should be used. 75
There are two widely recognized exceptions to the general rule
that corporate injuries must be redressed through a derivative suit:
when the injury also resulted in a breach of some special duty to the
shareholder, and when the shareholder has suffered an injury which is
separate and distinct from that suffered by other shareholders, the
shareholder may sue directly. 76 An example of the former type of in-
jury is one which results in damage to a shareholder's contractual
right, such as a voting right. 77 An example of the latter is where a
fraud has been perpetrated on the shareholder alone, 78 or the share-
holder has personally guaranteed the corporation's debts.79 Norman
argued that he fell within this second exception to the general rule. He
argued that the shareholders' agreement gave rise to a contractual re-
lationship between himself and NGK and NPL.80 Thus, although the
contract was made for the benefit of AAP, when read in combination
with the stock purchase agreement and employment agreement it also
gave rise to a duty running from NGK directly to Norman."' Norman
sought to recover damages for the loss and destruction of his stock
which he claimed to be a result of NGK's breach of the shareholders'
agreement.8 2
The Alaska Supreme Court held that the destruction of the value
of Norman's stock was an injury suffered in common with the other
shareholders, and thus could only be redressed through a derivative
73. Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp., 28 Cal. 2d 525, 530, 170 P.2d 898, 901
(1946) (en bane); Wells v. Dane, 101 Me. 67, 70, 63 A. 324, 325 (1905).
74. E.K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 900, 62 N.W.2d 288, 307
(1954).
75. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Davis, 140 Tex. 398, 407, 168 S.W.2d
216, 221 (1943).
76. See W. FLETCHER, supra note 64, § 5921.
77. See, e.g., Lipton v. News International, P.L.C., 514 A.2d 1075, 1078 (Del.
1986); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 366, 230 A.2d 769, 777
(1967) (right to vote is a right the shareholder possesses independently of any right of
the company).
78. See, e.g., Ritchie v. McMullen, 79 F. 522 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 168 U.S. 710
(1897); Sutter v. General Petroleum Corp., 28 Cal. 2d 525, 170 P.2d 898 (1946).
79. See Buschmann v. Professional Men's Ass'n, 405 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1969).
80. Norman v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 645 P.2d 191, 196 (Alaska 1982).
81. Id. at 196-97.
82. Norman, 645 P.2d at 195. "[He] measured this damage as 20 percent (his
stock ownership interest) of the minimum book value of the stock assuming defend-
ants had not breached." Id.
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action on behalf of AAP.83 The court also refused to accept Norman's
argument that the stock purchase, employment, and shareholders'
agreements formed a single contract, and chose to analyze each agree-
ment separately.8 4 The Alaska Supreme Court denied Norman any
right to sue under the shareholders' agreement.
The Alaska Supreme Court, holding that Norman could not re-
cover for the destruction of the value of his stock through a direct
action, relied heavily for precedent on the Nebraska Supreme Court's
decision in E.K Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert. 85 However, while the
Nebraska Supreme Court in E.K Buck had applied the same "benefit
to the corporation" test for the validity of a shareholders' agreement,8 6
and had come to the same conclusion that a shareholder must bring a
derivative action to recover damages if the agreement is breached, 87
the E.K Buck court's analysis of the issue rested on a premise which
the Norman court failed to follow.
The Nebraska Supreme Court in E.K Buck recognized a single
exception to the general rule that a shareholder may only recover for a
wrong to the corporation through a derivative action. This exception
arises "when he has sustained a loss separate and distinct from that of
other shareholders."8 8 In other words, unlike the Alaska Supreme
Court in Norman, the Nebraska court declined to follow those cases
holding that a breach of a special duty, such as a contractual duty,89
also gives rise to a direct cause of action. This holding was crucial to
the Nebraska court's analysis of why the plaintiff in E.K Buck could
not recover, through a direct action, damages in proportion to his
shareholdings, for the losses inflicted on the company as a result of the
breach of the shareholders' agreement.
The E.K Buck court decided to uphold the shareholders' agree-
ment because it was for the benefit of the corporation and all share-
holders alike, and thus made the finding that all shareholders had
suffered the same injury by its breach a logical necessity. This finding
required the conclusion that the plaintiff, because his injury was iden-
tical to that suffered by the other shareholders, could only recover for
his losses through a derivative action.90 The E.K Buck court accepted
83. Id. at 195-96.
84. Id. at 197.
85. 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288 (1954).
86. Id. at 894-95, 62 N.W.2d at 305; cf Norman, 645 P.2d at 196 (applying the
"benefit to the corporation" test). See also supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
87. The plaintiff in Buck sought to recover 40% of the losses sustained by the
company as a result of the breach of the shareholders agreement in accordance with
his 40% of the company's shares. E.K Buck, 157 Neb. at 894-95, 62 N.W.2d at 305.
88. Id. at 899, 62 N.W.2d at 307.
89. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
90. E.K Buck 157 Neb. at 899, 62 N.W.2d at 307.
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that this conclusion presented the plaintiff with a dilemma: If the
plaintiff, in order to bring a direct action, argued that he had suffered a
separate and distinct injury because of a breach of the agreement, then
the agreement would not have benefited all shareholders alike and thus
would have been held invalid.91
Paradoxically, the E.K. Buck court appears, despite the above
analysis, to have upheld the lower court's grant of injunctive relief in a
direct action brought by the plaintiff shareholder. 92 E.K Buck might
thus be seen as authority for only the limited proposition that a share-
holder cannot maintain a direct action to recover damages for injuries
received by the corporation, and not for the wider proposition that all
actions on a shareholders' agreement must be brought by the corpora-
tion or through a derivative suit.93 Either way, the E.K. Buck court's
holding was based on a premise that the Alaska Supreme Court failed
to follow when it adopted the majority view that a breach of a special
duty also gives rise to a direct cause of action.94
The Alaska Supreme Court was thus correct in citing E.K. Buck
to support its argument that, since the loss and destruction of his
stock 95 was the major element in Norman's claim for damages, he had
not suffered an injury that was separate and distinct from that suffered
by the other shareholders.96 Its analysis, however, was flawed when it
again cited E.K. Buck to support it argument that NGK owed Nor-
man no special duty.97 The Alaska Supreme Court claimed that E.K.
Buck stood for the proposition that because the validity of the share-
holders' agreement rested on the fact that it was made for the benefit
of all shareholders, "any duties owed under the agreement were owed
primarily to the corporation and its shareholders."983 In fact, the pas-
sage that the Alaska court cited in E.K Buck merely recites the argu-
ment that the mutuality of benefit required for the shareholders'
agreement to be valid precludes any argument that the shareholder
suffered any special injury.99
The Alaska Supreme Court went on to argue that because NGK's
duties under the agreement were owed primarily to AAP, any benefit
91. Id. at 900, 62 N.W.2d at 307.
92. Id. at 894, 62 N.W.2d at 304.
93. This holding would be consistent with the general theory concerning third
party contract beneficiaries. See infra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
94. Norman v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 645 P.2d 191, 195 n.9 (Alaska
1982).
95. Id. at 195.
96. Id. at 197.
97. Id. at 196.
98. Id.
99. E.K. Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 898-99, 62 N.W.2d 305,
307 (1954). See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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Norman would derive from the agreement would be solely in his ca-
pacity as a shareholder. The court argued that this showed that Nor-
man was only an incidental beneficiary of the contract and that, since
"Norman's right to have the parties perform their obligations under
the shareholders' agreement [was] derived solely from that agree-
ment," 100 then Norman's right to enforce the agreement was only inci-
dental, and "that right [to enforce the agreement] belonged directly to
the corporation."101
The obvious problem with the argument that only the direct ben-
eficiary, AAP, could enforce the shareholders' agreement was that
AAP had never signed the agreement.102 Indeed, under traditional
Anglo-American contract theory, AAP, as a third party beneficiary,
would have had no right to enforce the agreement,10 3 and would have
been dependent on Norman and the other promisees to defend any
rights it had under the agreement.10 4 Even under the modem view,
both the promisee and the third party beneficiary would have a right
to enforce the contract.105 The Norman court thus succeeded in
standing traditional contract theory on its head.
Justice Matthews, in a vigorous dissent, in which Chief Justice
Rabinowitz concurred, accepted Norman's argument that the share-
holders' agreement should not be viewed in isolation. He argued that
Norman had agreed to transfer the AAP stock to NGK in exchange
for NGK's promises in the shareholders' agreements, 10 6 and that,
100. Norman, 645 P.2d at 197.
101. Id.
102. The court cited the following language in Green v. Victor Talking Mach. Co.,
24 F.2d 378, 382 (2d Cir. 1928), in support of this point: "[D]espite the fact that [the
contract] was made with a shareholder, not with the corporation, nevertheless a
breach of duty would give a right of action to the corporation, not to its sharehold-
ers." Norman, 645 P.2d at 197 n.ll. This case is weak precedent for this proposition
for two reasons: First, the plaintiff in Green was suing in tort and had expressly de-
clined to sue on the contract. Thus, the court's remarks are clearly dicta. Second, the
quoted passage speaks of a contract with a shareholder, yet a right of action in the
shareholders. The contract in Green was between the plaintiff's dead husband, the
shareholder in question, and the defendants. The plaintiff in Green was thus not a
party to the contract and, unlike Norman, would have been unable to sue as a
promisee.
103. See, e.g., Merchants' Union Trust Co. v. New Philadelphia Graphite Co., 10
Del. Ch. 18, 83 A. 520 (1912); Furnas v. Durgin, 119 Mass. 500 (1876). See also
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge & Co., [1915] App. Cas. 847, 853 ("[fln the
law of England certain principles are fundamental. One is that only a person who is a
party to a contract can sue on it.").
104. Dunlop, [1915] App. Cas. at 853. But see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 302-315 (1979) (shows the modem American rule that donees and
creditors, but not incidental beneficiaries, have a right to enforce a contract as third
party beneficiaries).
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 305 (1979).
106. Norman, 645 P.2d at 199 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
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under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,10 7 this agreement cre-
ated a duty in NGK running to both AAP, the beneficiary, and Nor-
man, the promisee.10 8 Justice Matthews argued that the duty NGK
owed Norman to contribute money to the corporation under the
shareholders' agreement was precisely the type of duty which could
give rise to a direct cause of action under the exception to the general
rule that an injury to the corporation must be redressed through a
derivative suit.109 In Justice Matthews' view, the depreciation in the
value of Norman's stock was a result of NGK's breach of this duty.
Justice Matthews cited a series of New York cases to support his argu-
ment that Norman should have been allowed to recover from NGK
for the loss in the value of his stock.' 0
In Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd.,"' an opinion that was
delivered almost four years after Norman, the Alaska Supreme Court
overruled those portions of the Norman decision in which it had dis-
cussed the shareholder standing issue. 1 2 The appellants in Hikita
were Alaska Foods, one of the parties to the AAP shareholders' agree-
ment, and Takehiro Hikita, the majority shareholder of Alaska
Shokai, Japanese parent company of Alaska Foods." 3 Alaska Foods
and Hikita had fied suit against NGK and NPL in October 1977, over
two years after the latter had abandoned AAP, claiming that NGK
had breached the shareholders' agreement and that NGK had com-
mitted various torts against Hikita and Alaska Foods." 4 NPL was
joined as a defendant on the theory that it was the alter ego of NGK
and the two companies had acted as though they were a single
entity. ' 15
The superior court granted NGK's motion for summary judg-
ment.11 6 It gave two reasons for its dismissal of the breach of contract
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 305(1) (1979) (providing that:
"A promise in a contract creates a duty in the promisor to the promisee to perform
even though he has a similar duty to an intended beneficiary.").
108. Norman, 645 P.2d at 199 (Matthews, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Norman, 645 P.2d at 200 (Matthews, J., dissenting) (quoting Higgins v. Ap-
plebaum, 186 A.D. 682, 686-87, 174 N.Y.S. 807, 810 (1919)).
Where ... the value of [a shareholder's] stock has been depreciated by the
failure of his cocontractor to furnish moneys needed by the corporation
which he has stipulated with plaintiff to advance, then the damage is directly
traceable to his breach of contract and for that damage he may be held indi-
vidually liable.
Id. See also cases cited infra note 149.
111. Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 713 P.2d 1197 (Alaska 1986).
112. Id. at 1200.
113. Id. at 1198.
114. Id. at 1199 n.4.
115. Id. at 1198 n.l.
116. Id. at 1199.
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claims. First, it held that the Norman decision barred a direct ac-
tion.117 Second, it held that the prior litigation between AAP and
NGK and NPL barred Alaska Foods' suit under section 56 of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments. 118 The superior court dismissed
the tort claims on the ground that they were brought after the expira-
tion of the two year statute of limitations. 19
Chief Justice Rabinowitz's opinion for the court in Hikita paral-
leled the arguments of Justice Matthews' dissent in Norman. ' 20 The
Hikita court accepted that, in general, a shareholder can only recover
for wrongs suffered by a corporation through a derivative suit on the
corporation's behalf.' 2 ' The court felt, however, that Alaska Foods
fell within the exception to the general rule, because NGK had
breached a special duty it owed Alaska Foods. The court stated that
"[a] shareholders' agreement for the benefit of a corporation does cre-
ate a duty running to both the corporation and the promisee."'122 The
breach of this contractual duty gave rise to a direct cause of action
"even if [the shareholder] had not suffered an injury separate and dis-
tinct from that suffered by other shareholders."'12
3
The Hikita court concluded that if Alaska Foods could show that
NGK had breached the shareholders' agreement, then it could recover
"all proximate damages that can be proved with reasonable cer-
tainty."' 24 Whether "all proximate damages" would include damages
for the lost value of the AAP stock is open to question. In Norman,
however, Chief Justice Rabinowitz joined in a dissent which had ex-
pressly approved Norman's claim for the loss in the value of his
stock.125 The court in Hikita did state that it would allow a direct
117. Id. at 1199 n.4.
118. Id. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 56 (1980) (states that judg-
ment against a third party beneficiary to a contract also terminates the promisor's
obligation to the promisee).
119. Hikita, 713 P.2d at 1199 n.4.
120. Not only had Chief Justice Rabinowitz joined Justice Matthews' dissent in
Norman, but Matthews joined with the majority in Hikita.
121. Hikita, 713 P.2d at 1199.
122. Id. at 1200.
123. Id.
124. Hikita, 713 P.2d at 1201. The court upheld the superior court's dismissal of
Hikita's contract claims on the ground that since he was neither a promisee nor a
beneficiary he had no rights to enforce. Id. at 1201 n.11. The court also concluded
that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 56 (1980) did not bar Alaska
Foods' action, since none of the prior suits had made a determination of whether
Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. had breached its duty to Adak Aleutian Processors
under the shareholders' agreement. The court upheld the superior court's dismissal of
Hikita's and Alaska Foods' tort claims. Hikita, 713 P.2d at 1202.
125. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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action even where the shareholder had not suffered a separate and dis-
tinct injury. 126 The Hikita court also noted that Norman's claim for
loss of stock value had been dismissed because the loss was an injury
suffered in common with other shareholders and, therefore, neither
separate nor distinct. 127 Thus, there is a clear implication that the
court would uphold damages based on the loss in value of stock.
IV. A REVIEW OF THE PROBLEMS WITH THE ALASKA SUPREME
COURT'S APPROACH AND A SUGGESTION FOR
AN ALTERNATIVE
The decision in Norman v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 128 while
conclusively settling the issue of the legality of shareholders' agree-
ments in Alaska, also succeeded in making them virtually useless as a
control device. The major purpose of a shareholders' agreement is to
protect minority shareholders from the dangers inherent in the
majoritarian concepts that are the basic norms which govern the cor-
porate statutes. The Norman court's denial of a direct action to the
parties to a shareholders' agreement left the aggrieved minority share-
holder in an unenviable position if the majority breached a sharehold-
ers' agreement. The requirements of a derivative action are both the
product of, and an enforcement device for, those very corporate norms
that the shareholders' agreement was designed to guard against.
The procedures for a derivative action are set out in Alaska Rule
of Civil Procedure 23.1.129 This rule has never been construed by a
court of record in Alaska, but it is almost identical to Federal Rule of
126. Hikita, 713 P.2d at 1200.
127. Id. at 1199-1200.
128. Norman v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 645 P.2d 191 (Alaska 1982).
129. Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1 states:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association having
failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint
shall be verified and shall allege that the plaintiff was a shareholder or mem-
ber at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share or
membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of law. The complaint
shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to
obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and,
if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for his fail-
ure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. The derivative action
may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly
situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association. The action
shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court,
and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to share-
holders or members in such manner as the court directs.
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Civil Procedure 23.1,130 and an Alaska court would undoubtedly fol-
low federal precedent when interpreting its provisions. Rule 23.1 re-
quires the plaintiff's complaint to allege that he owned shares in the
corporation at the time of the injury complained of and to plead with
particularity the efforts he has made to persuade the corporation itself
to act by obtaining a directors' or shareholders' vote endorsing the
suit.131 Federal courts have developed this rule so that it represents
more than just a formality of pleading. In all but a few circumstances,
courts will not allow a suit unless there has been a demand on the
directors. 132 The rationale behind this demand requirement is that a
shareholder should exhaust his intra-corporate remedies before resort-
ing to the courts.1 33
Once a demand on the directors has been made, federal courts
have applied the business judgment rule. Under the business judgment
rule, courts will not second-guess a director's decision if it was made in
good faith and pursuant to a legitimate business purpose. Thus, a de-
rivative action cannot be brought where the directors, acting in good
faith, have refused to sue. 134
If, as the Norman court suggested, a minority shareholder must
bring a derivative action to enforce a shareholders' agreement, he will
thus face a double barrier of the demand requirement and the business
judgment rule. To succeed, he must show either that demand on the
directors should be excused135 or that the directors' refusal to act on
the demand was in bad faith.1 36 Not only is this requirement a tedious
prerequisite, but, if Alaska follows the standards applied by the courts
in other states, it will also be onerous. In most jurisdictions demand
will only be excused where the directors are accused of wrongdoing or
130. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. The major difference between the federal rule and
the Alaska rule is the jurisdictional requirement under the federal rule that the com-
plaint must allege that the action is not a collusive one. Compare id. with ALASKA R.
Civ. P. 23.1.
131. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 23.1.
132. See, e.g., Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Kauffman
Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973). For
a brief history of the demand requirement, see supra note 66.
133. See, e.g., Evangelist v. Fidelity Management & Research Co., 554 F. Supp. 87
(D. Mass. 1982); see also Note, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Share-
holder Derivative Actions, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 168 (1976).
134. See, e.g., United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S.
261 (1917); Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1982); Note, Demand on
Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV.
746 (1960). For criticism of this doctrine, see Note The Propriety of Judicial Defer-
ence to Corporate Boards of Directors, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1894 (1983).
135. See supra note 70.
136. See, e.g., Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 786 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
880 (1982).
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violating their duty of care.' 37 In some jurisdictions, such as Dela-
ware, this requirement has been extended and the allegation must con-
tain particularized facts to support the accusation of director
misconduct.' 38 The enormity of the business judgment rule as an ob-
stacle to plaintiffs is seen in the recent trend to extend judicial defer-
ence to the decisions of a minority of the board of directors acting with
the full board's authority in a special litigation committee. 139
While the decision to form a special litigation committee is un-
likely to occur in the close corporation setting because of the expense
involved, the decision to breach a corporate contract, like the decision
to abstain from night baseball games, 14 is just the type of decision to
which courts have applied the business judgment rule and refused to
review the directors' actions. Even if the decision were not subject to
the business judgment rule, the ratification of the directors' decision by
the majority shareholders would preclude a challenge unless the mi-
nority shareholder could show fraud. 14 1 Thus, under the Norman
rule, the minority shareholder is left with an unenforceable piece of
paper in place of the protections of the shareholders' agreement.
The decision of the Alaska Supreme Court in Hikita v. Nichiro
Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd. 142 to overrule Norman may have ended the mi-
nority shareholders' problems with derivative suits, but it may have
created more problems than it solved. Hikita represents a dangerous
extension of liability for majority shareholders through its erosion of
137. Id; see also Barr v. Wackman, 36 N.Y.2d 371, 377, 329 N.E.2d 180, 185, 368
N.Y.S.2d 497, 504 (1975).
138. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624-25 (Del. 1984); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 814-16 (Del. 1984).
139. For three cases showing the spectrum of judicial approval of special litigation
committees, see Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); Auerbach v. Benett, 47
N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979). Contra Abella v. Universal
Leaf Tobacco Co., 495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980); Miller v. Register & Tribune
Syndicate, 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983).
For an interesting critique of the special litigation committee, see Cox &
Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundation and Legal Implications
of Corporate Cohesion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985). For collected cases
see, Annotation, Propriety of Termination of Properly Initiated Derivative Action by
Independent Directors by "Independent Committee" Appointed by Board of Directors
Whose Actions (or Inaction) are Under Attack, 22 A.L.R. 4TH 1206 (1983).
140. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 I1l. App 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968) (holding
that the decision not to install lights at Chicago's Wrigley Field was subject to the
business judgment rule).
141. See, e.g., Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325, 200 A.2d 398 (1964) (rati-
fication by shareholders of directors' lack of due care will bar a derivative suit, but this
rule will not apply when the allegation involves fraud, self dealing or waste by the
directors). Contra Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955)
(majority of shareholders can ratify fraud).
142. 713 P.2d 1197 (Alaska 1986).
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the business judgment rule's protection of directors from the fear that
all their decisions may be subject to subsequent critical review by a
court, which has the benefit of hindsight. Hikita also involves a rejec-
tion of the traditional protection of creditors that is embodied in the
requirements of the derivative suit.
If Hikita really does stand for the proposition that a minority
shareholder may recover damages from the breaching shareholder for
the loss in stock value that occurs as a result of a breach of a share-
holders' agreement, 143 then a majority or managing shareholder
should be careful how that agreement is drafted. A simple clause re-
quiring a shareholder to exert his best efforts on behalf of the corpora-
tion could result in the total elimination of the business judgment
rule's protection of directors' action from judicial scrutiny. 144 The
managing shareholder of an Alaska corporation who makes un-
guarded predictions as to future returns or makes vague promises
could, under Hikita, find himself insuring the other shareholders
against all risks of loss.
While it seems logical that a breach of a shareholders' agreement
should, like the breach of any other contract, leave the breaching party
subject to the entire range of contract remedies, there is always a sec-
ond contract at issue in corporate litigation. The corporation itself
could be said to represent a contract with the state as well as a con-
tract among the shareholders. The state gives to the corporation the
benefit of limited liability,145 but in exchange imposes certain obliga-
tions for the protection of creditors. 146 One of these obligations is that
shareholders, as well as creditors, respect the legal status of the corpo-
ration as an entity. The rule that corporate injuries be redressed
through a derivative suit is part of this obligation. The shareholders
are not the corporation, but rather are its owners and most junior
creditors.147 The derivative suit protects the interests of those with
more senior claims than the shareholders.1 48 The Hikita court, by al-
lowing a shareholder to recover for the loss in the value of his stock
through a direct action, has allowed minority shareholders to bypass
the senior creditors' claims and freeze senior creditors out of any re-
covery for mismanagement.
143. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
144. Alaska Foods' claim in Hikita was based on precisely this type of "best ef-
forts" clause. Hikita, 713 P.2d at 1199.
145. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.126 (1985).
146. See, e.g., id. § 10.05.543 (1985) (providing for action by creditor for
liquidation).
147. Id. § 10.05.561 (1985) (upon liquidation remaining assets are to be distributed
to shareholders "according to their respective rights and interests").
148. See supra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
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While the Hikita court's decision to allow a direct action that
imposes liability on a breaching shareholder for losses in the value of
other shareholders' stock is not without precedent, 149 it is the product
of flawed thinking. Although the analysis of the rights of parties to a
shareholders' agreement is conceptually difficult, this author suggests
an alternate approach based on the merger of two distinct bodies of
law - corporate and contract. This approach requires a resolution of
the conflicts that necessarily arise between these bodies of law, a reso-
lution which can be achieved only by focusing on which rights are
peculiar to each of them.
The parties to a shareholders' agreement are in a unique position
because they have rights based on two distinct roles. They are both
the promisees in a contract for the benefit of a third party, the corpo-
ration, and the ultimate beneficiaries of that contract, since they are
shareholders in the corporation. While it is true that under contract
theory both the parties to the agreement and the corporation, as a
donor beneficiary, have a right to enforce the agreement, 150 in the
event of a breach of the agreement only the intended beneficiary, the
corporation, will suffer any real damage. The parties to the agreement
will also be injured, but mainly in their role as shareholders, as a result
of the harm done to the corporation. In their role as promisees their
injury is nominal.
With this conceptual outline as a foundation, this author suggests
that it is possible to allow shareholders to maintain both direct and
derivative actions for breach of a shareholders' agreement and to
achieve the desired middle ground between the extremes of the Nor-
man and Hikita decisions. The shareholders, as promisees, should
have a right to a direct action for a breach of the shareholders' agree-
ment, 15 but, because they will suffer only nominal injuries as promis-
ees, they should not be able to recover damages through this direct
action. However, nominal damages represent an inadequate remedy
at law and thus they would have the right to demand equitable relief
and its remedies of specific performance and injunction. 52 These eq-
uitable remedies should be sufficient to protect minority shareholders
from the majority when the latter is determined to renege on a share-
holders' agreement. The availability of this direct action means that
the minority shareholder can seek the court's protection with relative
ease and rapidity. This approach thus avoids the pitfalls of the Nor-
man decision.
149. See, eg., Eden v. Miller, 37 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1930) (following New York law).
See also Higgins v. Applebaum, 186 A.D. 682, 174 N.Y.S. 807 (1919); Meyerson v.
Franklin Knitting Mills, 185 A.D. 458, 172 N.Y.S. 773 (1918).
150. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 305 (1981).
151. Id.
152. Id. § 307.
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If the majority's actions have also harmed the corporation in the
meantime, then a minority shareholder, as a shareholder, would have
a right to bring a separate derivative action on the corporation's behalf
to recover damages. The requirements for a derivative suit 53 would
allow the majority shareholder some protection against a nuisance
challenge to his managerial decisions. Furthermore, because any re-
covery would be by the corporation, creditors would be able to partici-
pate, and the danger of a creditor freeze-out, a potential hazard
inherent in the Hikita decision, would be avoided.
V. CONCLUSION
In the absence of any action by the legislature to provide for the
special needs of Alaska close corporations, the Alaska Supreme
Court's decision in Hikita is to be welcomed. It is to be hoped that it
represents the start of a trend toward judicial flexibility with regard to
the Alaska Business Corporation Act. Hikita, however, protects mi-
nority shareholders at the expense of the majority and the corpora-
tion's creditors. The adoption of the alternative approach suggested
by this note would balance the interests of all three. Both Norman and
Hikita are once again before the Alaska Supreme Court.154 While
they are being appealed on issues peripheral to the focus of this note,
the cases provide the court with a perfect opportunity to clarify its
earlier decisions.
B. Neil S. Clarke
153. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 23.1. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
154. Norman v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 645 P.2d 191 (Alaska 1982), appeal
docketed, No. S-1968 (Alaska Jan. 5, 1987). The issue on appeal in Norman is
whether the superior court should have reopened the case after final judgment, in light
of the supreme court's decision in Hikita v. Nichiro Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., 713 P.2d
1197 (Alaska 1986).
Hikita, 713 P.2d 1197, appeal docketed sub nom. Alaska Foods, Inc. v. Nichiro
Gyogyo Kaisha, Ltd., No. S-1933 (Alaska Dec. 9, 1986). The issues on appeal in
Alaska Foods are whether the superior court was correct in holding that the litigation
between Adak Aleutian Processors and Bank of California, supra note 41, and be-
tween Adak Aleutian Processors and Nichiro Pacific, Ltd., supra note 39, had a res
judicata effect on Alaska Foods because Adak Aleutian Processors and Alaska Foods
were in privity of contract.
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